Uruguay Round Anti Dumping Agreement

(22) If the anti-dumping duty is established retroactively, the finding of the most recent assessment procedure under Article 9, paragraph 3.1, that no duty should be levied is not, on its own, subject to the obligation to terminate the final right. The agreement establishes a Council on Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights that relates to trade, responsible for monitoring the functioning of the agreement and compliance with the agreement by governments. Dispute resolution would take place within the framework of the GATT`s integrated dispute resolution procedures, as revised in the Uruguay Round. The agenda, originally enshrined in the Uruguay Round agreements, has experienced additions and modifications. Some items are now part of the Doha agenda, some of which have been updated. Throughout the anti-dumping investigation, all interested parties have the opportunity to defend their interests. To this end, the authorities give all interested parties, on their application, the opportunity to meet with those parties with unfavourable interests, in order to assert opposing views and to refute the arguments. The provision of such opportunities must take into account the need to maintain confidentiality and accommodation with respect to the parties. Participation in a meeting is not mandatory and non-compliance with that meeting does not interfere with that party`s case. Interested parties also have the right to provide additional information orally in support of these reasons.

For the purposes of Article 11, paragraph 3, existing anti-dumping measures are deemed to be instituted no later than the date a member of the WTO agreement enters into force, unless the domestic law provisions of a member in force on that date already contain a clause of the nature provided by this paragraph. There is a history of dumping that caused harm or that the importer was or should have been aware that the exporter was dumping and that such dumping would cause harm, and the twenty agreements were signed in Marrakech in April 1994, the Marrakesh agreement. a significant increase in domestic dumped imports, indicating the likelihood of a significant increase in imports; Groups such as Oxfam have criticized the Uruguay round for not paying enough attention to the specific needs of developing countries. One aspect of this criticism is that figures very close to the rich agricultural industries – such as Dan Amstutz, former board of Cargill – have played an important role in the development of the language of the Uruguay Round in the field of agriculture and other issues. As in the case of the WTO in general, NGOs such as Health Gap and Global Trade Watch criticize what was negotiated during the intellectual property and industrial tariffs cycle as too many restrictions on policy development and human needs. One article states that developing countries have their experience in the WTO negotiations and have not been aware of how developing countries would be influenced by what developed countries wanted in the WTO; strengthening the mercantilist attitude of the main POWER of the GATT/WTO, the United States; The structure of the WTO, which has rendered the GATT tradition of non-consensual decision-making ineffective so that a country is not maintained to the status quo, is at the root of this imbalance. [13] The agreement establishes a harmonization programme that will be launched as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and which will be completed within three years of its launch.

You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.

Comments are closed.