What Are Two Reasons Kennan Felt The Munich Agreement Was Unnecessary

„Throughout the summer of 1938, the accumulation of Nazis against Czechoslovakia unfolded rapidly; and in September, the famous Munich crisis occurred, which shook Europe to its foundations. With the details of this crisis – Chamberlain`s meeting with Hitler in Bad Godesberg, his subsequent dramatic flight to Munich, his concession that Hitler should have the Sudeten territories of Czechoslovakia, the Czech capitulation, the fall and flight of the Czech government, the occupation of much of Bohemia and Moravia by the Germans and the reduction of what remained of the Czechoslovak Republic, on Germany`s state of defenseless dependence – we are familiar with all this. There is no day more tragic in European history than that of Munich. I remember that well; for I was in Prague at the time, and I will never forget the sight of the mourners in the streets when the news of what had happened came through the speakers. Georg F. Kennan was Director of Planning Personnel for the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1947 to 1949. In his book Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (1960), he wrote of the Munich Accords: „The Munich Accords were a tragically misunderstood and desperate act of appeasement at the expense of the Czechoslovak state, perpetrated by Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Daladier in the vain hope that Hitler`s tempestuous ambition would satisfy. and thus ensure a peaceful future for Europe. We now know that it was useless – useless, because the Czech defence was very strong, and if the Czechs had decided to fight, they could have put up considerable resistance; even more useless because the German generals, aware of Germany`s relative weakness at that time, were in fact ready to depose Hitler if he had insisted on pushing things to war.

It was the fact that the Western powers and the Czechoslovak government gave in at the last moment and that Hitler once again achieved a bloodless triumph that removed any excuse from the generals for such a move. You still see, as so often in history, that it is sometimes worth facing your problems in a masculine way, even if there is no certain victory in sight. As Hitler continued to deliver inflammatory speeches calling for the reunification of the Germans in Czechoslovakia with their homeland, war seemed imminent. However, neither France nor Britain felt ready to defend Czechoslovakia, and both were anxious to avoid a military confrontation with Germany at almost any cost. In France, the Popular Front government had come to an end, and on April 8, 1938, Édouard Daladier formed a new cabinet without socialist participation or communist support. Four days later, Le Temps, whose foreign policy was directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published an article by Joseph Barthelemy, a professor at the Paris Faculty of Law, in which he examined the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance of 1924 and concluded that France was not obliged to go to war to save Czechoslovakia. Earlier, on March 22, the Times of London said in an editorial by its editor G.G. Dawson that Britain could not go to war to preserve Czech sovereignty over the Sudeten Germans without first clearly determining their wishes; Otherwise, Britain could „fight against the principle of self-determination.“ Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a document declaring their common desire to resolve differences through consultations to ensure peace. .

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